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I. Introduction
	Much of the understanding which has been gained within the biological sciences has been based upon the traditional account of the phylogenetic lineages of organisms.  Evolution, understood as a series of splits, or speciation events, has been the accepted model.  The causal relationship between the information contained within the genome and the morphology or ancestry of the organism is thought to be sufficiently close such that given knowledge of one, the others can be inferred.   On this account, the phylogenetic inference of an organism’s ancestral lineage is thought to be sufficiently justified by the belief that there is one common cause (or shared ancestor) of each  taxon which permits only one true ancestral lineage or ‘true tree’.  This means that morphology and ancestry are derivable given the information contained within the genome.  And further, that the information contained within the genome can be predicted given the morphology of the organism.
	However, the phylogeny of genomes has a level of detail which is absent from the traditional organismal account of phylogenetics.  The phylogenetic tree which has been relied upon to trace organismal lineage as a series of splits, signifying speciation events, does not work for genome (or gene) lineages.  The traditional form of the species (or organismal) tree diagram represents the ancestral history of the organism as a continuous lineage.  This lineage can be traced by following the progression of the two-pronged forks which compose the tree and represent the speciation events.  Dendrograms start with one initial type of organism which is represented by the root of the tree and represents the shared ancestor of all other organisms within a particular dendrogram which have branched from that tree, making a new species.
	The traditional organismal phylogenies fail to preserve this level of detail of genomic phylogenies in two ways.  Firstly, the history of a genome includes both the movement of genes from parent to offspring in reproduction, but also the transfer of genetic material in gene duplication events occurring within the genome itself.  Secondly, unlike the dendrogram model of organismal phylogeny, the model of genomic lineage is more reticulate.  This is because organismal phylogeny traces only the reproductive lineage of one taxon.  Whereas the phylogeny of genomes can trace the reproductive lineage as well as either the history of gene duplications within the genome, or the acquisition of genes from horizontal gene transfer. One cannot simply ‘read off’ the phylogenetic lineage of genomes from the phylogenetic lineage of organisms. 
	In light of this distinction, it no longer makes sense to take the organism as the primary  object of study within biological history. Although biological entities can still be explained by referring to their phylogenetic history,  I argue that this history need not be solely or even primarily as organisms.  The modification and divergence of biological entities including genes, proteins, and living systems—  not just organisms, can all be understood through different phylogenetic lineages.  
	Although aspects of biological entities can be explained, the traditional approach of tracing a phylogeny gives an incomplete account of ancestry if these are based solely on single type of organismal genealogy.   This approach is based on the assumption that biological entities must be classed as whole organisms, typical biological kinds or even idealized biological objects.   But, given the multiple sources which contribute to the evolution of a genome, there does not seem to be any set of characters or genes which can be picked out as constituting the typical genome.  Nor can there be any set of characters which can be used to pick out a particular species as the defining, or complete phenotypic or genotypic complement.  One cannot assume that any part or trait which is possessed by an organism is fully understood in terms of the reproductive history or species history.  Much of the analysis of genomes has shown that there are other biologically significant parts or genetic sequences which also exist.  Apart from those which play a role in speciation or are in some sense ‘species specific’, there are many others which can be picked out as informative in terms of biological history. 
	These additional considerations make the traditional phylogenetic analysis incomplete for use within genomics.  Because of this, many concepts which are used within biology, based on the traditional organismal understanding of phylogeny, must be reconsidered and reformulated for use within genomics.  Today, I wish to give an analysis of one of these concepts of biological investigation which must be reconstructed in order to account for these differences between organismal phylogeny and genomic phylogeny.  This concept is that of homology.  
	The traditional account of homological similarity is based upon the morphological characteristics which are used in tracing organismal phylogeny.  However, I will show that homological comparisons which involve genes, gene segments, and whole genomes require a different set of criteria for similarity and a reconstruction of the concept of homology.
II. What is Homology?
	Homology has been one of the most fecund concepts used in analyzing and understanding the objects of study within comparative biology.  However, it is a concept which has been, and continues to be, the subject of much debate and confusion. 
	One of the earliest accepted definitions of homology was stated by Owen in 1843, as “the same organ in different animals...”.  This original concept of homology was defined as structural similarity between organisms and given in terms of their relative position and orientation.  
However, this definition was later changed to ‘structural similarity of two or more organisms due to their shared ancestry’. 
	Owen’s definition of homology was initially given to distinguish the different kinds of relations of biological similarity which could exist between organisms.  His definition was intended to contrast the concept of homological similarity from the concept of analogical similarity.   The biological concept of analogy was defined in terms of the functional similarity which was picked out in the comparison of parts of different organisms.  For example, the fins of a fresh water salmon, a blue whale, and a sea lamprey are analogically similar in terms of their functionally comparable role in enabling the organism to maneuver itself around an aquatic environment.  An example of a homological comparison would be the fin of a whale and the forelimb of an ox.   Instead of focusing on the contrasting forms and functions of the fin to the forelimb, or in the difference in bodily shape of the whale and the ox, Owen sought to concentrate on the similarities between the two appendages by comparing the structure, pattern and orientation of the character under study (the limb or fin) within the organisms compared (the ox or whale).  Later definitions of homology, following Darwin, explained the appearance of structural similarity as a result of a shared ancestor. The two appendages were homologous, not by their function and form which differed, and not because of their position or orientation, but by the inference of a common ancestor from which both species had diverged.
	However, ‘similarity’ does not have a transparent meaning when picked out by the concept of homology.  Any two organisms, or parts, can be seen as similar, in some trivial way.   To avoid this meaningless sense of ‘similarity’, one needs to find some criteria which can be relied upon to restrict what count as similar.  This restriction would be to those similarities which can be reliably used to infer a shared ancestral history.  The criteria for what kind of similarity is homological is crucial in defining the concept of homology.
A. What are the Problems?
1.      	There are two related problems which have plagued attempts to define the concept of homology.  The first problem arises in clarifying what kind of similarity is involved in a homological comparison.  A second problem occurs if more than one concept of homology is needed to pick out the kinds of similarity in different contexts of homological comparison. I will start with the first problem of similarity.  As the previous section illustrates, homology is usually understood as picking out what counts as ‘the same’ between two or more organisms. Many of the attempts which have been made to define the concept of homology focus on which criteria are used to restrict the kinds of similarity which exist between two or more organisms or parts being compared.  These are criteria which can be used reliably to infer shared ancestry. However, there have been many different attempts to define similarity which have produced a profusion of homology concepts.  This profusion has led both to the conflation of what counts as ‘the same’ in different contexts and have also muddled the relations of comparison which various concepts use to identify homologues.
	The muddle which has arisen from these attempts to define the concept of homology has centered around the answers given to two related questions:  1). ‘What are the criteria for similarity?’, and 2). ‘Through what causal processes do these relations of similarity arise?’.  These two questions are related because the way in which two character states of different organisms are causally connected depends on how we define similarity. Different homological relations which have been picked out as ‘the same’ include phylogenetic similarity, morphologic similarity, gene expression or correspondence in relative position.  The different causal processes which give rise to the relations of similarity picked out as homologies are also caused by a variety of causal processes or mechanisms; these include the reproductive or generative processes such as shared ancestry, gene duplication or horizontal gene transfer (these correspond to the different kinds of homology: orthology, paralogy, and xenology). 
	Although there is a multiplicity of homology concepts, most are still defined in terms of the morphological similarities between organisms.  This poses particular problems if homological similarity is restricted to the organismal phylogeny.  In addition to the parent- offspring movement of genes, which lead to modification and divergence of genes, there are also other historically interesting types of gene transference.  These can produce homologies other than the type of homology produced through reproduction and speciation (orthologues).    These include the divergence of genes after duplication events within organisms, and the horizontal gene transfer events, which can also lead to divergence after being acquired through the movement of genes from across organisms of different taxa.  
2.
	The second problem in defining the concept of homology arises if different homology concepts are needed to explain the different phylogenies reflecting the various ways in which genes can be acquired and diverge.  The phylogeny of species cannot be inferred by simply examining the phylogenies of gene duplications or horizontal gene transfers, nor can the phylogeny of gene duplications or horizontal gene transfers be inferred from the examination of species phylogenies. Homologies which are picked out for their historical value in tracing the ancestral lineage of some trait require homology which traces the history of orthologues.  Paralogues cannot be used to trace the lineage of two different organisms in terms of a shared ancestry, but are instead used to identify the historical events which led to the homology within an organism, in terms of the gene duplication events.  Homology of one type does not necessitate similarity of another type.
	But why is it that the phylogenetic lineage of a gene or genome cannot merely be inferred from the phylogenetic lineage drawn from a species or organism.  It is because gene phylogenies give the biological histories of DNA sequences, segments of genetic material or proteins.  Gene trees trace the ancestral history of a gene by following its lineage in terms of mutation and divergence, marked by the comparison of gene homologues.  Whereas, species phylogenies trace the lineage of whole organisms (or parts of organisms morphologically defined).  A species tree traces the ancestral history of speciation events.
C. Why is defining the concept of homology important?
	The biological significance of finding homologous genes within organisms (paralogues) or between organisms (orthologues), is that these similarities indicate the possibility of ascribing functions, developmental pathways, mechanisms, or structures which are required by a variety of species which present the same homological genes, proteins or gene sequences. Those sequences which are conserved between species are more likely to have functions than those genetic sequences which have not been conserved between species.  Therefore, searching for similar patterns or processes within organisms or genomes is important because it shows which common elements of many organisms throughout a specified ancestral lineage.  This pattern is useful because this common element is conserved (in orthologues).  Comparison of these important features also results in identifying features of the organisms within which they occur, as crucial to their development and viability. Some of these particularly crucial features of genomes which have been conserved over a large number and diversity of kinds of organisms have been identified as the ‘minimal’ features of any genome or those features which can be said to be ‘species specific’.
	Therefore, homological comparison suggests what is important, interesting or valuable in genomes.  The homological comparison can be used to identify what is unique, general or essential, and what is advantageous, or useful.  This analysis is possible by inferences from the conservation of genes and gene segments, as well as the gene loss or differentiation within a genome.  A concept of homology sensitive to the different relations of similarity in genomics presents a new kind of understanding within biology by showing what genetic information is meaningful.  What is meaningful or important about genomic homology is distinct from what is understood as important about morphological or organismal homology.  Instead of relying on the analysis of morphological similarity, the particular kind of analysis of the assembled mapping and sequencing data of the various genomes, homological comparison between genomes and within a single genome identifies the specific pattern of structural similarity, and the various processes in terms of molecular complexity.   
III. Different mechanisms of gene transmission. Different phylogenies.
	Much of the misunderstanding surrounding the concept of homology can be traced to a conflation of what is actually a whole set of related concepts, but defined in terms of the qualities of just one kind of homology within this set of concepts.  This tendency to conflation is most notable in the attempts of those who seek to define all the different kinds of homology in terms of a single phylogenetic concept of homology. Within both general biology and genomics, there is, currently, an acceptance of homology as being defined principally if not wholly in historical terms of the shared ancestry of organisms.  This definition of homology takes the phylogeny of an organism to be the most important, central, single or a priori criterion for inferring any homology under study.  
	Problems which arise with defining homology in terms of one criterion, or one set of criteria, is that such a definition only gives one way of answering the two questions above regarding the criteria for similarity.  If there is only one concept of homology, such as is the case in the phylogenetic homology concept, there is only one understanding of what counts as the principle relation of homology.
	The primacy of a phylogenetic homology concept has been challenged, however, by those who believe that the variety of homological relations which are possible cannot be accommodated with only one concept of homology. A phylogenetic homology concept need not be the single or definitive concept of homology with its emphasis on shared ancestry of speciation events of an organism. There are other historically interesting generative mechanisms which connect homologues besides  reproduction and speciation.  The transmission of genetic material which results in the presence of a homology can be caused by gene duplication, horizontal gene transfer, or reproduction/ speciation.  Sole reliance upon the phylogenetic homology concept have produced assumptions which have given rise to many unnecessarily restrictions on the concept of homology, including: the assumption that true homology is ‘really’ only possible between organisms, and the best, or only way to infer homology is defined as through the reconstruction of phylogenetic trees based on their shared ancestry. Instead of relying on phylogenetic homology concept as defining shared ancestry of organisms as the criteria of homology, I  argue that within genomics, one must rely on a whole set of related concepts, which include a variety of causal relations and mechanisms that give rise to the transmission of homologies.
IV. Conclusion
 	Although the kind of similarity needs to be specified prior to any comparison in terms of homology, this need not be demarcated only in terms of a phylogenetic, monophyletic or even a ‘natural’ grouping.  I argue that the primacy of the phylogenetic homology concept is based on a number of faulty arguments. The first argument is that there is one true natural order.  The second is that no non-arbitrary kind of similarity can be suitable for homological comparison, and third; that there are indeed possible non-arbitrary criteria which pick out one natural grouping suitable for all homological comparison.  
	Firstly, I have argued that there is not one true natural order, but in fact, many important and interesting natural histories which can be selected for homological comparison.  For instance, one can identify the similarity to be within or between the genomes or organisms.  Homological comparison is possible either in terms of the gene duplication events within the organism, or between organisms or genomes in terms of speciation or HGT events.  This means there are a diversity of possible natural histories which can be picked out as interesting.  These would follow from the whichever kind of ancestral lineage would be informative for any particular kind of homological comparison.  
	Secondly, I argue that the requirement of non-arbitrary criteria for similarity which is constant is just as difficult for those using a concept of homology based upon the apriori assumption of phylogeny or monophyly as it is for a concept based on structural similarity or connections.  The main requirement must still be that the homology concept one chooses much be able to differentiate between the kinds of homology. The requirement for differentiating homological relations requires specifying the criteria for similarity, and the location (within or between organisms) where homological comparison takes place.  One of the best arguments against the view that there can only be one non-arbitrary natural monophyletic grouping comes from looking at molecular phylogenomic analyses in comparison to morphological or ‘species’ phylogenetic analyses.
	As I have mentioned before, phylogenomics creates different ancestral histories than the traditional phylogenetic dendrograms because instead of basing the phylogeny upon speciation events (or using morphological data), as in a species tree, the gene tree is based on the phylogenetic branching which results from molecular data such as mutation events, gene duplication events or horizontal gene transfers. These are two completely different ‘natural’ histories since speciation events often come after molecular events. Therefore, the phylogenetic lineage which is traced in the species tree will be different from the phylogeny traced in the gene tree.  
	 Depending upon the kind of homological comparison, the monophyletic group from which the homology can be said to be a result will change depending upon what one picks out to compare.  As a result, both the assigned taxa of organisms (or genomes) and the actual groupings of organisms, from various phylogenomic gene trees, will differ from the taxa assigned and groupings represented from phylogenetic species trees.  This occurs because genomes tend to possess genes, not only from their direct parental-species lineage, but also inherit genes and gene sequences from a wide variety of other organisms from different taxa. 
	Therefore, the last argument for the primacy of the organismal (or traditional) phylogenetic homology concept fails.  The requirement of a possible non-arbitrary criteria   which picks out one natural grouping for homological comparison does not serve to secure one ‘natural’ framework for homological comparison.  It fails, principally because the criteria which are used to define similarity are subject to the various interests of the characters which are being compared.
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